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deter[s83,jmc]		The ethics of deterrence

for Free Inquiry, Box 5, Central Park Station, Buffalo, New York 14215-0005
(716)834-2921
editor = Paul Kurtz

	THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

	The ethics of deterrence are clear; the disagreement is
about the facts.

	The ethical and practical case for nuclear deterrence involves
the following contentions:

	1. If the United States fails to deter the Soviet Union
by maintaining sufficient nuclear military power, there is a substantial
probability that the Soviet Union will be tempted to use military
power to impose their rule on much more of the world, including possibly
the U.S. itself.

	2. This would be very bad for the U.S. and anyone else who
fell under Soviet rule.

	3. If we maintain a suitable nuclear deterrent, there is a good
chance we will escape Soviet rule.

	4. There is a good chance we will avoid nuclear war.

	One cannot make a case for nuclear deterrence without making
some assertions about the nature of the
Soviet Union.  We feel no need for a nuclear deterrent against Canada
and they feel no need for a nuclear deterrent against us.
The countries of Western Europe at present maintain no nuclear
deterrents against each other.
However, any estimate of the likely behavior of the Soviet rulers is
uncertain.  When Churchill called the Soviet union a riddle wrapped
in an enigma, he wasn't kidding.

	Therefore, we begin with an estimate of the Soviet Union,
and an estimate of the uncertainty of this estimate.

	The political character of the Soviet Union is the result
of an interaction between communist ideology and the increasingly
oligarchic society that has developed since the revolution.

	Establishing a level of trust that would make it possible to
rely on the Soviets not to cheat on arms control or not to abuse power
 is not promising.  The perfidy
of the capitalist world is one of the foundations of the ideology and
one of the foundations of the claim for the legitimacy of the rule.
No non-communist American ever gets credit for good will; an action
of which the Soviet Government approves is praised as "realistic",
as recognizing the futility of the previous policy.
Moreover, quite apart for the ideological hostility to capitalist
countries, they have shown themselves ready to betray their ideological allies
when it seems to be advantageous.
The ideological justification for this used to be that the Soviet
Union is the Workers' Fatherland and workers of all lands should
sacrifice for it.  We haven't heard much of this recently, but
other socialist nationalities can be accused of bourgeois nationalism
but this charge is never heard about Russian nationalism.

	Moreover, it is part of communist ideology that capitalist
countries are controlled by the capitalist ruling class and in the
interests of that ruling class.  It is always regarded as political immaturity
and during the Stalin period was regarded as evidence of treason
to attribute good motives to any action, e.g. Eisenhower's proposals
to share nuclear technology, no matter how altruistic the action
appears.  No Soviet official would dare defend before his colleagues
and action of a capitalist country as well motivated.  The out, as
mentioned before, is to ascribe the action to realism on the part
of the capitalists.  Realism means that the capitalist in question
partially realizes that socialism will inevitably prevail on some
point and has resigned himself to the inevitability.

	All this means that no Soviet official can oppose Soviet
cheating on any agreement on any grounds but the narrowly pragmatic.
It is not agreed that the capitalist countries have any rights
that a communist is bound to respect.  It is analogous to some
pre civil war slaveholder who said, "No Negro has any rights that
a white man is bound to respect".

	We need to pay for the abolition of the secrecy.

	Bargain for the elimination of the Soviet draft.

	Since the Soviet Union is rather unpredictable, we
should maintain offers but not create conditions where we
hold ourselves responsible for lack of progress in negotiations.

	Every time the ruler is replaced, there is some chance
that the new ruler will have ideas that he never dared admit before.
The Eisenhower Administration may have missed an opportunity
with Kruschev by adopting a wait-and-see policy and by maintaining
the U-2 flights.  On the other hand there may not have been
such an opportunity; we just can't tell.

	There was no apparent opportunity when Brezhnev took over,
and all the evidence is that Andropov will be harder to get along
with than Brezhnev.  The evidence is that Andropov is emphasizing
the methods of the KGB with which he is familiar in both internal
and foreign politics.

	Whatever policy we adopt must be one we can sustain for
the forseeable future.

How bad is a nuclear war?

	It would be very bad, but there are upper limits.
Putting any upper limit on how bad a nuclear war is subjects
one to a dishonest attack.  One is accused of not opposing
or even favoring nuclear war if one resists the worst scenarios.

	A nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
would be very bad indeed.  The initial effects would kill
a large fraction of the population of both countries, and
it probably wouldn't stop.  We should picture it as comparable
to the disaster that befell Cambodia when it came under communist
rule.

	I can think of no circumstances that would justify the
United States attacking the Soviet Union.  I cannot imagine
our ever being so certain that they were going to attack us
that preemption would be justified.

	Therefore, I think the war we fear must be a Soviet
attack on the U.S.

	The simplest scenario is the long term plot.  Many have
imagined that the Politbureau has made a plan to acquire military
superiority and that when this superiority reaches an appropriate
point they will attack.  This is conceivable but unlikely.  You
have to believe that Brezhnev was working toward this goal during
his entire rule, but did not get impatient that it should happen
in his lifetime.

	It seems to me that there are three main dangers.

	1. Napoleon

	2. A crisis arising from American political weakness.

	3. A technological surprise.

Morality

Can we overdo it?

yes, here's how

1. take the view that World War III has started.  This makes
permissible any action that would be permissible in war time.
Many such actions are immoral as long as we have some hope
of avoiding active war.  We have avoided war for 35 years, and
we can hope to avoid it indefinitely.

2. Escalation of action.  Attempting to assassinate Castro, if
it happened, was immoral.

3. Double-crossing allies.  If we support the Nicaraguan rebels
in order to prevent Nicaraguan aid to El Salvador rebels, we can't
simply abandon them if the Nicaraguans offer to stop helping
their friends in El Salvador.

De-escalation is better.  If they expel 5 diplomats wrongly,
retaliate by expelling 3.

Don't forget, however, that the peaceniks have their own sins
to atone for.  Cambodia, Operation Keelhaul, the Finns turning
back escapees from the Soviet Union.

The risk of nuclear war in the third world.

Is the motivation for opposing our side loss of political power?
morality of this.

Reagan plan for mutually assured defense.

If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

Maybe I can get LLW, Sidney Hook and Edward Teller to review it.

Almost every important person in public life has already take
a position on the many defense issues.  They tend to look for
evidence supporting their previously taken positions.


	It has often been suggested that since nuclear war is
so terrible we should surrender if it is threatened.  I have
been brooding for several years about a letter by Leonard Bernstein
published in the %2New York Times%1 in which he argued that the
Russians couldn't do much even if they occupied the United States.

Here is what a Soviet occupation of the United States might be like.
Each item is supported by a corresponding event in Soviet occupation
of other countries.

	1. All the hardships suffered by the Soviet people since the
revolution will be blamed on the capitalist encirclement of which
the United States is the main villain.  Anything that is done to
the United States or its people will be justified by this.  Anyone
who contemplates complaining will be charged with every real and
imaginary crime against the Soviet people.  The peasant soldiers
sent to carry out the occupation will be thoroughly indoctrinated
with this view, and the bureaucrats and other opportunists will
use it to justify the most shameful looting and brutality.  The
Russian soldiers behaved very badly in both allied and enemy
territory at the end of World War II.  Solzhenitsyn's first
conflict with Soviet authority came when as a Red Army captain
at the end of World War II, he tried to prevent crimes against
the civilian population.

	2. Industry will be looted as it was in Eastern Europe,
Germany and Manchuria.  The prospect that most of its value
will be destroyed in shipment didn't deter the Soviets then
and it mightn't deter them in the future.

	3. Hostages will be taken and killed if their is resistance.
This policy was used during the revolution and is being used
in Afghanistan.  Whole cities might be bombed with nuclear weapons
in order to convince other Americans not to co-operate with any
resistance movement.  The doubtful reader should practice writing
a justification of this based on Marxism.

	4. An important strategy used in suppressing resistance
when the Russians re-occupied them at the end of World War II
was the mass exchange of population.  A substantial part of the
populations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were shipped to
Siberia where many died and replaced by Russians.  The main
cities in these countries are now half Russian in population.

	5. Finally, there is no guarantee that surrender would
avoid nuclear war.  Now that there are a number of communist
ruled countries, we can see that the self-righteousness of
communist ideology leads them to quarrel with each other and
even to go to war with each other for what seem to us to be
trivial reasons.  If we were occupied we would find ourselves
considered useful cannon fodder in wars and occupations of
other communist ruled countries, e.g. China.

	6. When the ruler dies there is a succession crisis.
When one candidate for the succession has overwhelming power,
the transition is peaceful.  However, the history of oligarchy
shows that sooner or later the sides are close to even and
fanatically determined to get power.  There is always a certain
probability of civil war, and this time it would be nuclear.